Pursuant to its 2008 Stabilization and Association Agreement governing the process of EU integration Serbia is obliged to align its consumer protection standards (including those related to enforcement) with those of the EU. This article considers the overall approach to enforcement of consumer law in Serbia, focussing in particular on the extent to which EU enforcement principles have been successfully exported to Serbia and whether the goals of EU consumer policy have been achieved. It argues that the incorporation of EU norms has brought fundamental changes to Serbian enforcement mechanisms at a formal level, such as in relation to mediation processes as well as the introduction of injunctions for the protection of collective consumer interests. In practice, however, the impact of this incorporation is quite limited. A number of factors that restrict the practical effectiveness of the mediation processes and injunctions required by EU law are explored in the article, including weak sanctions; excessive reliance on poorly resourced consumer organizations; absence of a business culture of compliance or a sophisticated and determined consumer protection enforcement culture sufficiently grounded in expertise; as well as an overarching political, legislative and institutional instability. These factors also undermine the general aim of EU policy to achieve effective consumer protection enforcement in the Serbian context.
This article focuses on this latter issue of enforcement. It considers the enforcement regime that has emerged in Serbia and the impact of EU consumer protection enforcement norms, i.e. to what extent have these norms been successfully exported to influence the Serbian enforcement regime? The essential argument is the following. EU norms and have brought some fundamental changes to Serbian enforcement mechanisms at a formal level. The most important of these are (i) mediation processes at the individual/alternative dispute resolution (ADR) level and perhaps more significantly (ii) the use of injunctions as a means of preventive and collective control. However, in practice, the impact of these EU based norms and, indeed, the impact of broader EU policies on the general Serbian enforcement regime remains very limited. This is due to a combination of factors. Probably the most significant overarching factor is that the mechanisms are not designed specifically for the local consumer needs irrespective of whether the issue is ineffective sanctions, over reliance on under resourced consumer organizations, an "anti compliance" business culture and the lack of a sophisticated and determined consumer protection culture that is sufficiently grounded in expertise. "Culture" here is understood as a set of habits, systems of belief and values, social behaviour and tradition (Piché 2009 with further references). Finally, these various problems are exacerbated by overarching political, legislative and institutional instability.
Before developing these arguments, some introductory points should be emphasised about the approach taken. First, "enforcement" here is understood in its broad sense, as encompassing the mechanisms and rules thorough which businesses or others are held to their legally imposed responsibilities (Scott 2010) . Secondly, within this broad framework, the article differentiates public and private, individual and collective, preventive (ex ante) and corrective enforcement (ex post), and administrative, judicial and extra-judicial enforcement mechanisms. At the same time, it should be recognised how difficult it is to make clear distinctions between some forms of enforcement, especially between public and private enforcement (Cafaggi 2009) . With this in mind, the paper treats public enforcement as being enforcement by public agencies and government organs, acting in the public interest and mainly conducting administrative procedures. Since in Serbia there is no single regulatory and enforcement agency that would be competent for consumer protection enforcement, public enforcement is dispersed between specialized public agencies and other government institutions with divided competences and diverging powers. Private enforcement, by contrast, is in the hands of non-governmental,
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Fourthly, the literature suggests that enforcement issues are much less related to consumer law as such, than to the economic, social and political characteristics of the given state (Micklitz 2012) . A key facet of this in Serbia is that enforcement of consumer protection law has not been subject to much research. The available information is scarce and often contradictory. To bridge this gap, to a certain extent, the author relies on her own experiences, 7 as well as on the information gained from other consumer protection activists, and from the employees of public agencies. In addition to these various State bodies, various other institutions have important roles to play, including consumer organizations, inspectorates (other than the Section for Market Inspection), public agencies, the judiciary and consumers themselves. To sum up, the above discussion shows that the various ADR schemes, particularly mediation, are generally in line with key EU norms, including accessibility and perhaps enforceability, but in practice there are very serious deficiencies. Of course, practical enforcement problems will always be partly caused by lack of awareness by consumers of their rights and of the available dispute resolution mechanisms. Another possible factor may be a cultural tendency of Serbian people to feel "ashamed" to complain or to admit that they have been a victim of "foul play". 34 However, the really key distinctive factors undermining practical effectiveness have been weak sanctions and the presence of an anti-compliance business culture. It has been suggested that the latter is possibly connected to a Serbian mentality of being stubborn in pursuing one's own conception of "justice" thereby making it difficult to reach compromise (Kovačević 2006) .
II. The impact of EU norms on consumer protection enforcement in Serbia

II.2. Using Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers
The There are several problems related to this type of enforcement, including a variety of general procedural problems as well as specific problems related to the fact that only consumer organizations have standing to seek injunctions.
legislative initiatives, 40 (26.85%) were accepted, 100 (67.11%) not accepted and 9 are pending (6.04%). See above 34 The author is thankful for this insight to the activist of the Association of Consumers of Serbia given in an informal conversation in July 2012.
In relation to general procedural drawbacks, neither the CPRA nor the CPA provides any exception regarding the fees and expenses of the procedure when the proceedings are initiated by consumer organizations. Additionally, the CPRA now provides that the representatives of parties can only be lawyers (Art. 85 CPRA), which raises the cost of the procedure. Even though the rule is that the losing party pays all the expenses, since the outcome is uncertain, as judges may often be reluctant to decide against powerful businesses, especially monopolistic enterprises, and the expenses due during the process can be substantial, having no exception in favour of consumer organizations is a deterrent factor to represent consumers in judicial actions. Moreover, if the dispute ends with judicial settlement, each party bears their own expense, which is again a negative incentive for consumers, including an incentive not to settle (Art. 158 CPRA). Another general procedural problem is that in the procedure for collective actions no damages can be claimed, damages are awarded in a separate procedure according to general rules of civil procedure.
An additional limitation is due to the absence of special rules regarding the effects of the judgement. According to the general rules, the judgement relates only to a specific claim and a specific defendant having effect only between parties to the dispute (Art. 342-343 CPA). Therefore, the judgement rendered in one case will not extend to another, regardless of the similarity of subject matter. However, there is potential for a limited effect towards third parties, as after declaring the term null and void, the court might order the business to discontinue the use of an unfair term in contracts that will be concluded in the future.
Therefore, injunctions can be an effective corrective enforcement tool, though depending on the judge's discretion. However, they do not provide a desirable corrective solution in case of unfair contract terms, as the judgement does not touch upon already concluded contracts not subject to the dispute.
The second key problem is that under Art. 137 CPA only consumer organizations have standing to represent the collective interests of consumers in judicial actions. However, these organizations are seriously lacking in both funding and expertise.
Consumer protection organizations are non-profit and non-governmental, independent organizations created based on the 
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Probably due to its different funding structure Efektiva had the necessary resources to file the first collective action in February 2013 against three banks for unilateral amendments of the fixed part of the interest rate and for selling mortgage loans indexed in Swiss Francs.
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In conclusion, since the CPA entrusted the collective enforcement of consumer rights only to consumer organizations, which are under-staffed and under-resourced, there is a danger that in practice the preventive and collective protection of consumers will be ineffective.
III. The impact of EU policies on the consumer protection enforcement framework
Besides the impact of EU norms on consumer protection in Serbia as considered above, we now turn to how the broader enforcement framework fits into the general EU policies. The general EU requirement for the protection of consumer, or other interests under EU law is that legal protection should be effective and appropriate (Reich 2009 p. 310 should be politically and financially independent from their founder (Arts. 4 PAGA).
Supervision of agencies is vested in the ministry, whose tasks are entrusted to the agency (Art.
44-46 PAGA).
There are a large number of public agencies in the Serbian legal system (Aleksić 2012 ), but only a small number of those directly operate in the sphere of consumer protection.
Enforcement by public agencies is especially common in the area of public utility services. Therefore, it seems that both preventive and corrective enforcement by public agencies is insufficient; with too much emphasis on their regulatory and administrative function at the expense of the enforcement function. A key reason for the weakness of enforcement activity is the insufficient power of agencies to impose sanctions.
A special form of public agency is the Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) established in 2005 and regulated by the Act on the Protection of Competition of 2009
(ACP). 59 The CPC, accountable only to the National Parliament (Art. 20 ACP), enjoys the largest degree of political independence (Beljanski 2008) . In contrast, the above mentioned agencies are open to significant political influence (Beljanski 2008) . Moreover, the CPC is solely financed from independent sources, i.e. from the services it renders (Art. 31 ACP).
Although fines for competition infringement are payable to the state budget (Art. 57 ACP), the 56 The author is grateful for help on this point to the activist of the Consumers Association of Serbia. The informal conversation took place in March 2013.
CPC retains revenues for rendering decisions on concentration clearances and decisions on
exceptions from restrictive agreements that represent constant and significant funding sources for the CPC.
The CPC has been accorded more significant enforcement powers compared to other public agencies in Serbia. It has significant investigative powers (Art. 52 ACP), and, more importantly, it can directly impose fines on businesses (Art. 68 ACP). At its establishment, the CPC was powerless to impose direct fines and like other agencies had to resort to the misdemeanour courts to actually impose the fine determined. Courts however, instead of enforcing, annulled the decisions of the CPC. As a result, in the first five years of operation no fine was imposed for the violation of competition by the CPC (Radojević 2010) . At the end of 2009 the new ACP came into force that granted this enforcement power, and already in 2010 the CPC issued two fines. 60 Therefore, the primary reason that hindered the efficiency of the CPC was the lack of power to directly impose fines (Radojević 2010) . Unfortunately, the CPC has no direct powers to enforce consumer protection regulation.
III.2. The case of the Inspectorates
Enforcement by inspectorates is the traditional public enforcement tool in Serbia.
Inspectorates are part of the public administration, and according to Art. 18 PADA they are in place to control the lawfulness of the activities of natural and legal persons and, depending on the results of such controls, order different measures within their competence. Inspectorates are established within sectoral ministries, with centralized control and coordination, and complicated internal structure. 61 Currently there are 33 inspectorates within 14 ministries. (Stanojev 2009 ). The powers of inspection therefore may be directed towards preventive, corrective or repressive measures (Dimitrijević 1983, p. 279) .
A large number of inspectorates are competent to enforce consumer law. However, as the rights, duties and powers of inspection are not laid down in one legislative act, the powers of this institution vary depending on the area of consumer protection. While potent on paper, the principal problem with this enforcement mechanism is that, despite the accountability mechanisms in place, inspectors often fail to act. Inspectors may act on their own initiative within regular surveillance activity, and upon the report of natural and legal persons. However, in practice it is difficult to reach the inspection to report a violation of the law. Additionally, the inspector has no obligation to report information on the measures that have been taken. Moreover, though inspectors have an obligation to act, the issue of whether there was a breach is often left to the interpretation of the inspector. 68 Finally, often, even if inspectors notice irregularities, they stay passive. 
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22 also includes a need for a new act that will clarify and if possible unify the procedure of surveillance, the powers of inspectors, and the rights and obligations of subjects of surveillance. It seems the current government sees inspectorates crucial in creation of a modern state that is based on the rule of law, and set the reform of inspectorates as one of its priorities. 73 It remains to be seen how far the reform will go, and how soon results will be seen.
III. 3. Some Additional Problems
Besides the various causes outlined above, the failure of enforcement in Serbia is consumer protection, the principal government institution facilitating consumer protection policy and oversight of the CPA has changed three ministries within the past four years.
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Changes to the law are too frequent, without paying attention to the aggregate positive and negative effects of the existing law or the change (Milovanović 2009 ). Additionally, the government on occasion does not respect the law itself, at least not the CPA. For instance, under
Art. 153 CPA certain secondary legislation for the enforcement of the CPA was supposed to be adopted within six months, but has still to be adopted after two years of operation of the new law. Moreover, Art. 126 CPA provided for the establishment of the National Council for
Consumer Protection (NCCP) as a principal advice body to the Ministry, yet it was almost a year and a half after the CPA entered into force before the NCCP was actually established. In addition, political interests and biases often undermine the stability of enforcement.
The underlying reasons for the lack of enforcement are often not the absence of legal regulation, or the unavailability of enforcement mechanisms, but rather in the lack of (political) will to use the available powers. For example for several years credit contracts secured by mortgage contained a clause according to which banks could change one component of the interest rate, the margin of the bank, according to their business policy. The only obligation banks had was to notify the consumer in writing on the change. This was clearly an unfair term, which allowed the bank to change one of the core elements of the contract without any objective and foreseeable criteria. It was an unfair term according to the general rules of contract law, 79 and according to the Art. 44 CPA. However, it was an established practice of banks to incorporate the clause into their contracts, and on several occasions they took advantage of it by raising loan interest rates, especially during the financial crisis. The practice of the banks was well known to everyone, especially the NBS, as the CPEFSU received a number of complaints on this ground. And yet the NBS, being the supervisory authority for financial service providers, did not use any of its powers to issue fines or commence misdemeanour proceedings. In November 2011 the FSUPA came into force expressly forbidding such contract clauses, in both future and currently running contracts, subject to high fines. It has to be underlined that the principal drafter who possibly inserted the provision into the law was, in fact, the NBS. Moreover, contrary to its previous practice, the NBS started to enforce the law, and issued several fines against banks for noncompliance with the FSUPA. Namely, as a measure to mitigate the consequences of unilateral amendment of the interest rates based on Art. 54(2) FSUPA the banks were obliged to adjust the variable component of the interest rate to the maximum level that it had at the moment of contract conclusion. Two banks that failed to initiate contract amendments in timely manner were subject to 11 fines. 80 One question is why it took so long for the NBS to begin to take such proper enforcement action and the answer is probably to be found in the wider, political, legal and economic context. The NBS was most probably protecting the banks, which are mostly built on foreign capital, being afraid of their withdrawal from the market. This protection should be understood together with high capital requirements, difficulties to collect outstanding debt, and the relatively minor importance of breaches compared to the perceived benefit brought by the foreign banks. Since the debt collection problem has been eased, and the capital requirements lowered, the NBS changed its policy, enforcing the consumer protection laws at least to some extent. 81 This example nevertheless shows how political biases can compromise the effectiveness of consumer protection enforcement. 
IV. Recommendations for a More Efficient Consumer Protection Enforcement in Serbia
Based on the above analysis, some suggestions can be made for improving the system of consumer protection enforcement in Serbia in line with EU norms and policies.
IV. Without going into details, the special model for Serbia, whichever its name would be, should provide for a fast, cheap, accessible solution, and end with a binding decision. The procedure should be conducted by trained personnel on consumer protection, and any dispute resolution panel could be comprised of both the representatives of traders and consumers. It would be preferable to apply a mixed procedure, which firstly aims to mediate between the parties, and only thereafter renders decision on the merits of the case. The reason for this is that an agreement, where the parties participate in its formulation, is more easily acceptable to them; but if mediation is unsuccessful the ADR body should be competent to render a binding decision on the matter. The ADR bodies should be independent and impartial, be bound only by the law, and ethical and moral rules (Fejős 2009 ). The Arbitration Boards of Hungary could serve as a model, with slight modifications . In order to remedy the deficiencies in the present ADR mechanisms it would be key to make the decision of the ADR body binding on the parties. Additionally, the best results would be achieved if submission to the process would be obligatory for the parties, as one of the key reasons existing ADR mechanisms are not successful is their voluntary character, allowing businesses to refuse to take part. However, since making the ADR scheme binding on the parties may limit the right of the parties to fair trial, it is important that fair trial is protected by a number of guarantees. These should especially include a guarantee that the ADR body consists of experts, has procedural guarantees similar to the judicial process, and in the absence of an appeal, there is a possibility of annulment by the courts (similar to Art. 58 of Arbitration Act) or of commencing a court action on the same matter as it is provided in Art. 135 CPA.
It is worth to note the creation of a special ADR for consumer disputes is currently on the agenda in Serbia, but at the time of finalizing the paper the paper the outcome is uncertain.
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IV.2. The funding and professionalism of consumer organizations Even though the CPA gives important powers to consumer organizations, in practice they do not have capacity to properly take advantage of the designated powers. As indicated, the primary problem is the lack of sufficient and constant funding that would allow organisations to build up and employ relevant experts.
The CPA states that registered consumer organizations "may" be financed from the budget of the central, regional or local government, leaving it unclear whether they must or 
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The example of Efektiva shows that alternative ways of funding, from membership fees and rendering professional services is also possible. But it should be born in mind that the "new model" of consumer organizations might not work in other areas of consumer protection.
Namely, Efketiva is specializing in protecting banking clients. It is directed not only towards consumers but also legal persons. It was formed at an opportune political moment, after the adoption of the FSUPA. It provides help in the area that requires highly professional knowledge and information which the majority of consumers are willing to pay for. Finally, court actions are directed against banks, which as losing parties are likely to have sufficient funds to pay for the expenses of the organization. Although the model might work in other areas of consumer protection, and consumer organizations should be encouraged to find alternative sources of funding, the Government should not be relieved from its funding responsibility. Government funding, especially targeted funding towards litigation should be encouraged. In EU only a few consumer organisations are effective litigants, and these are exactly the organizations in Germany and Austria that rely almost entirely on government funding (Cafaggi and Micklitz 2008, p. 24) .
IV.3. Standing to protect the collective interests of consumers to the Commission for the
Protection of Competition
In order to increase the level of consumer protection in Serbia, one option is to spread the burden by empowering the CPC to sue for violations of unfair terms and unfair commercial practices, and to represent the collective interests of consumers.
The CPC is suitable to represent consumer's interests. It is a public agency that enjoys the highest degree of independence. It has sufficient funds and manpower. It mostly enjoys good reputation and authority, and the protection of consumers and their welfare is within its purposes. It has a general jurisdiction. It has significant investigative and enforcement powers.
The CPC is therefore more suitable to pursue collective actions, than the other sector specific public agencies entrusted with consumer protection enforcement.
In the majority of EU jurisdictions, besides consumer organizations, public agencies are also empowered to protect the collective interests of consumers (Leuven study p. 324).
Taking the example of the battle against unfair terms in the UK, the activities of Office of Fair Trading (OFT) significantly improved the protection of consumers. Before granting enforcement powers to the OFT, the only form of enforcement was private litigation. 84 As the judgment's effect only between the parties in the dispute was not a deterrent and sufficient to eliminate unfair contract terms from the marketplace, private enforcement was largely ineffective (Willett 2007, p. 405) . After legislative changes, Reg. 12 of the Unfair Contract
Terms Regulation 1999 (UTCCR) conferred on a variety of bodies power to seek injunctions, among which the OFT took a leading role. In addition to injunctions, the OFT may ask the business to remove or amend the terms of the contract (Reg. 10 UTCCR). This proactive role of the OFT is very important, and successful in eliminating unfair terms from the contract before any harm would be done. Within its proactive role it issued principles and guidelines how to avoid the use of unfair terms.
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Therefore, a public authority as the CPC has resources and powers to detect the unfair terms, and to eliminate them from the contract. Also, the mere existence of such an authority is a deterrent factor for a business to use unfair terms in consumer contracts. Besides annulling the term, and forbidding its future use, the public authorities have means and resources to ensure businesses will not continue the use of the same or a very similar term having equivalent economic effect. This task could be better entrusted to powerful and independent public agency than to courts, which do not have monitoring powers over the contracts, and are slow in solving disputes.
Furthermore, the EU policy seems to go towards the dominance of public enforcement, so that for instance EC Regulation 2004 86 calls for one public authority to be designated that will be responsible for cross-border enforcement. While the regulation applies only to cross-border issues, it clearly shows the intention of the European Commission to place domestic enforcement into the hands of public agencies (Micklitz 2010, p. 45) .
Finally, as judicial collective enforcement mechanism largely depends on national regulatory traditions and cultures (Cafaggi and Micklitz 2007, p. 9 ) and taking into account that these are exactly the reasons why some enforcement mechanisms in Serbia are not working, a designated and strong public agency may have more potential to influence cultural gaps.
V. Conclusion
One can say that the rights of consumers are protected when the interaction of enforcement mechanism and substantive rules provides fast, affordable, impartial, enforceable and accessible solutions. At first sight it seems that Serbia has a "healthy" combination of administrative and judicial enforcement. However, by examining the system in detail, one can observe serious loopholes and conclude that enforcement is not working well.
EU norms have brought some fundamental changes to Serbian enforcement mechanisms at a formal level, both in relation to mediation processes at the individual/ADR level and, perhaps much more significantly, the use of injunctions as a means of preventive and collective control. However, in practice, their impact is still very limited and consumers often end up with no effective protection if they do not opt for individual litigation. One important response to this would be a special ADR mechanism for solving consumer to business disputes which has improved sanctions and overcomes the problems of the anticompliance business culture. Another priority is to improve the funding for consumer organizations to strengthen their ability to pursue injunctive relief; and to spread the burden of this preventive control by also empowering the CPC to seek injunctions.
However, it is not only the EU norms related to mediation and injunctions that are affected by the enforcement problems "on the ground" in Serbia. The general EU policy objective of effective enforcement is compromised within the broader enforcement framework of Serbia in several ways. Enforcement powers of public agencies are undermined by their lack of power to impose sanctions or other effective remedies. Enforcement by inspectorates is not working well due to the lack consumer protection culture and often the lack of expertise of inspectors. Finally, these specific problems are followed by a general political, legislative and institutional instability the overarching political, legislative and institutional instability.
Some of the above problems in relation to effective enforcement in the general system could be addressed by improving the powers of public agencies and the accountability of the inspectorates. However, ultimately, as consumer protection goes to the heart of the overall social order, until some underlying values change, it will be difficult to create a genuinely Serbia available at link.springer.com 
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